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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant. 
vs. 
Appeal NO. 970472-CA 
BERT CHARLES THOMAS, 
Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF tTPEISPICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Issue I: Did the court err in awarding the 
Respondent custody of the parties1 children where the court 
concluded that "it is clearly in the best interests of the 
children to be awarded to Ann Thomas", but for the findings 
regarding moral fitness and the character of a non-
cohabitant third party? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Court is 
subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice" 
standard. Maughn v. Maughnr 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984). 
b. Issue II: Did the Court err in limiting the 
Petitioner's alimony award to thirty-six (36) months 
without any supporting findings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Court is 
subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice" 
standard. Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989), and Tucker v. Tuckerf 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984). 
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad 
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision 
must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions." Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting 
Painter v. Painterf 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)). 
c. Issue III; Did the court err in failing to find 
that the family home was a marital asset in its entirety? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Court is 
subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice" 
standard. Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Riche v. Richef 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984). 
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad 
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision 
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must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting 
Pointer y, Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)). 
d. Issue IV: Should the court have included in the 
martial estate Bert Thomas Construction Company, including 
cash on hand which was depleted during the pendency of the 
case in part to pay court ordered support obligations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Court is 
subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice" 
standard. Maughn v, Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984). 
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad 
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision 
must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting 
Painter V, Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES &NP RULES. 
A. Statutes: 
i. §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
ii. Utah Code Ann, §30—3—10(1) (1953 as amended). 
iii. Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration 
iv. Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
B 
B. Case Law: 
i. Berger v. Bercrer. 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); 
ii. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
iii. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 
(Utah 1980). 
iv. Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 PI.2d 1131, 1132-33 
(Utah 1986); 
v. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 895 P.2d 835 at 838 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
vi. Kallas v. Kallasr 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980); 
vii. Lynn v. Lynnf 165 N.J. Super. 328 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1979). 
viii. Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989). 
ix. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 
1990). 
x. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
xi. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1980) 
xii. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 
1987) ; 
xiii. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
xiv. Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1992). 
xv. Sanderson v. Tryon. 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987). 
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xvi. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 816 P.2d 249 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
xvii. shioii v. Shioii, 671 P.d 135, 138 (Utah 1983); 
xviii, Stuber v. Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 637, 244, P.2d 
650, 652 (1952). 
xix. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 
1991). 
xx, Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984). 
xxi. Tucker v. Tucker, II. 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996). 
xxii. Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. (N.J. App. Div. 
1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF >^HE CASE. 
This divorce case was tried before Judge Lynn W. Davis 
between December 5 _ s, 1995 and February 26, 1995. Judge Davis' 
decision was rendered by Memorandum on August 19, 1996. The 
parties were married eight days short of their 15th anniversary. 
During the pend$nCy Df the action, Ann Thomas enjoyed custody of 
the two children subject to a liberal and nearly equal time 
sharing visitation agreement. Custody evaluations were performed 
by Dr. Elizabeth, B. Stewart and Dr. Jay P. Jensen. At trial Dr. 
jTensen testified that his recamoex>datd ox> was for the parties to 
divide the physicai time with the children equally. Dr. Stewart 
recommended that the Ann Thomas be awarded sole custody. The 
court found: 
"The reason this case is so troubling is 
because of Pedro Sauer and his negative 
t> 
influence on the family• Absent his entry, 
and his influence, it is clearly in the best 
interests of the children to be awarded to 
Ann Thomas." 
Findings of Fact, f79. 
Ann Thomas and Pedro Sauer developed a romantic 
relationship either just prior to separation or after separation. 
The court found that Mr. Sauer was a "convicted criminal", "suave" 
and "debonair." In determining that Mr. Thomas should be awarded 
custody of the children, the court considered the best interests 
of the children as "an important factor, but will also consider 
the past conduct and moral standards of the parties" Findings of 
Fact, f57. 
Mr. Thomas owned a home 35% completed and under 
construction at the time of the marriage. The court concluded 
that the value of the home was $150,000.00 at the time of the 
marriage based upon the opinion of appraiser Jud Harwood. Mr. 
Harwood's opinion as to the value at marriage was 
based upon a data base, notes and an interview which were not 
available in his report or at trial. 
Mr. Thomas owns Bert Thomas Construction Company. He is 
the sole owner of the company. It maintained a savings account 
throughout the marriage which averaged a balance of approximately 
$37,000.00. As money was required for the family from time to 
time funds would be disbursed to Mr. Thomas as income. That 
account was substantially depleted during the pendency of the 
case coincident with Mr. Thomas' self reported reduction in 
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income. The money was used, among other things, for the payment 
of court ordered support payments. 
Ann Thomas was awarded $700.00 per month alimony for a 
period of thirty-six (36) months to begin with the commencement 
of the temporary order. The effect of this order was to 
terminate alimony prior to the entry of the Decree. 
This appeal addresses the following issues: 
1. The legal standard applied by the court in 
determining custody and the weight to be given moral conduct. 
2. Whether the court articulated or had any basis to 
limit the duration of alimony. 
3. Whether the court should have considered the family 
home as a marital asset and commingled any premarital portion 
thereof. 
4. Whether the court should have considered the Bert 
Thomas Construction Company and its savings account as a 
dissipated marital asset. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Following the conclusion of trial in February, 1996 oral 
argument was heard on April 1, 1996. The court rendered its 
decision on August 19, 1996. The ruling did not deal with all of 
the issues presented at trial. The ruling did not specify Mrs. 
Thomas' visitation rights or the amount and duration of alimony. 
These matters were heard subsequently by motion and two 
additional rulings were made which have been incorporated in the 
final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
? 
Divorce which were entered on July 9, 1997. Ann Thomas filed her 
Notice of Appeal on August 5, 1997. 
C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL. 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce on July 9, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married July 17, 1983. 
2. The parties have had two children born of the marriage 
as follows: Joseph, born July 12, 1986 and Katy, born July 8, 
1989. 
3. The parties separated on March 21, 1983. 
4. Mrs. Thomas is a schoolteacher, aged forty (40) years 
old, with a B.S. degree from the University of Utah. She teaches 
in the Alpine School District in the same school the children 
attend. (Findings of Fact, ff5 - 7.) 
5. Mr. Thomas is a self—employed building contractor, a 
high school graduate, who lives in the Sundance, Utah County 
area, and concentrates his business in that community. (Findings 
of Fact, fl8 and 9.) 
6. The trial court considered the "best interests of the 
child" as an important factor but also considered the past 
conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent will 
act in the best interests, and the other relevant factors such as 
keeping the siblings together and each child's bond with the 
parent. (Findings of Fact, f57.) 
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7. The court adopted Dr. Stewart's finding of a strong 
sibling bond and found that it was in the best interests of the 
children not to be separated. (Findings of Fact, f58.) 
8. Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children 
prior to the parties' separation and has performed well as the 
mother of the children before separation and since. (Findings of 
Fact, f62—63.) 
9. Mr. Thomas acknowledged that Ann Thomas is a 
competent, caring mother who has indeed been the primary care 
giver for the children throughout their lives. (Findings of Fact, 
164.) 
10. As the primary care giver, Mrs. Thomas has seen to the 
day to day needs of the children, typically been the parent who 
has been home when they return home, assisted the children with 
their school work, made sure the children received the 
appropriate medical and dental care, typically transported the 
children when such was necessary, entertained the children, 
disciplined the children and so forth. Mr. Thomas was also 
involved in these activities. (Findings of Fact, f65.) 
11. The children interact with Mrs. Thomas as their 
primary care provider and have established confidence in her as 
the primary care provider. (Findings of Fact, 566.) 
12. The court interviewed Joseph and Katie in the course 
of the proceedings. (Finding of Fact, f52.) 
13. The children's social needs have principally been met 
through their school association. (Findings of Fact, f69.) 
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14. It is unclear when Ann Thomas and Mr. Pedro Sauer 
entered into a sexually intimate relationship, whether prior to 
separation or since that time. (Findings of Fact, f73(e).) 
15. The relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Mr. Sauer 
has continued for several years and it is their intention to 
marry when they are legally able. Mr. Sauer was still married at 
the time of trial. (Findings of Fact, 174.) 
16. Custody evaluations were performed by Dr. Jay P. 
Jensen and Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart. Both experts provided 
written evaluations. 
17. Dr. Jensen favored a joint physical custody award with 
the children residing with one parent for one week and the other 
parent the next with no intervening visitation for either party. 
(Trial Transcript, Volume III, page 113, Lines 4 - 2 5.) 
18. Dr. Stewart recommended that Ann Thomas be awarded 
sole custody. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 106, lines 2 -
13.) 
19. Dr. Jensen relied upon information related to him from 
Mr. Thomas who, reportedly, gathered information from Pedro 
Sauer's wife and Mrs. Thomas. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 
45, lines 13 — 25, and page 46, lines 1 — 13.) 
20. Dr. Jensen did not contact collateral sources provided 
by the parties because Mrs. Thomas had provided more collateral 
sources than Mr. Thomas and he wanted to keep the evaluation as 
"bilateral as possible." (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 47, 
lines 17 — 25, and page 48, lines 1 — 13.) 
10 
21. Dr. Jensen reported "through the evaluation process it 
became clear that information regarding Ann's boyfriend was a 
central concern to the best interests of the children." (Trial 
Transcript, Volume I, page 48, lines 9- 12) 
22. Dr. Jensen found "there are no apparent deficits of 
natural ability of either parent to provide for the children's 
physical, emotional and spiritual needs." (Trial Transcript, 
Volume I, page 53, lines 10 - 15). 
23. Mr. Thomas1 report regarding Pedro Sauer affected Dr. 
Jensen's perception of Mrs. Thomas and her ability to provide for 
the children. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 62, lines 8 -
19). 
24. Dr. Jensen was not able to observe any negative impact 
presently on the children by virtue of Mr. Sauer. (Trial 
Transcript, Volume I, page 63, lines 2 - 17.) 
25. Dr. Jensen testified that he did not believe Pedro 
Sauer played a central role in the formation of his opinion about 
the children's best interests. Rather, Mr. Sauer represented a 
potential and present "source of instability" to the children. 
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, Page 77, lines 1 8 - 2 5 , page 78, 
lines 1 -19.) 
26. Dr. Jensen determined that it was not necessary to 
speak to Mr. Sauer and did not, in fact, speak with Mr. Sauer. 
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 80, lines 15 - 25 and page 8, 
lines 1 - 7 . ) 
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27. Dr. Stewart interviewed the parties and Pedro Sauer. 
(Trial Transcript, page 92, lines 15-25, and page 93, lines 1-
6.) 
28. Dr. Stewart considered two principal questions: (1) 
whether or not Mrs. Thomas had an appreciation for the children's 
relationship with Mr. Thomas; and (2) Mr. Sauer's impact on Ann's 
parenting ability and whether or not that affects her ability to 
have custody. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 94, lines 4 -
11.) 
29. Dr. Stewart concluded that the Thomas marriage was in 
trouble for some time before Ann Thomas met Pedro Sauer and did 
not believe that Mr. Sauer was responsible for the divorce. 
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 95, lines 20 - 25; page 96, 
lines 1 - 2 5 ; and page 97, lines 1 - 20.) 
30. Based upon Dr. Stewart's evaluation of Mr. Sauer, Dr. 
Stewart concluded that Mr. Sauer was aware of Mr. Thomas' 
position, was sympathetic to that position and was not 
aggravating the relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Thomas and was 
sensitive to the children's individual differences and how they 
related to their father, as well as being generally supportive of 
Mrs. Thomas. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 100, lines 11 -
25, and page 101, lines 1 - 12.) 
31. Dr. Stewart did not observe any negative impact on 
the children by virtue of the relationship between Ann Thomas and 
Pedro Sauer. (Trial Transcript, page 101, lines 13—17.) 
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32. Dr. Stewart found agreement with Dr. Jensen's report 
as to Mrs. Thomas being an exceptional caretaker and that Mrs. 
Thomas was a very good father. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 
104, lines 1-9.) 
33. Dr. Stewart concluded that she saw no evidence that 
the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Pedro Sauer had a 
negative impact on her parenting skills. (Trial Transcript, 
Volume I, page 105, lines 8 - 25.) 
105, lines 8 — 25.) 
34. Dr. Stewart did not recommend joint legal or physical 
custody because the parties were unable to cooperatively work 
with one another. Joint physical custody would be too stressful 
on the children, and the children regarded their mother's 
residence as "home". (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 106, lines 
14 - 25; page 107, lines 1 — 5 , page 108, lines 1—23.) 
35. Dr. Stewart did not find that the children were aware 
of any confrontation between Pedro Sauer and Mrs. Sauer at Ann 
Thomas' home. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 17, lines 5 -
25, and page 18, lines 1 - 3 . 
36. Dr. Stewart agreed with Dr. Jensen's finding that Mr. 
Thomas was susceptible to "emotional overspill" because of his 
feelings about the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Mr. 
Sauer. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 20, lines 1-9.) 
37. Dr. Stewart could find no objective evidence that the 
Ann Thomas / Pedro Sauer relationship negatively impacted the 
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children. On the contrary Dr. Stewart found that Mr. Sauer's 
presence had a soothing effect and the children expressed a good 
relationship with Mr. Sauer. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 
24, lines 13 - 25; page 25, lines 1 — 2 5 , page 26, lines 1 — 
17.) 
38. The court conducted its own examination of Dr. 
Stewart and inquired, specifically, about "Brazilian culture", 
"machismo", and "how an individual with a Brazilian culture might 
approach a relationship such as this, at least at the initial 
stages." (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 43, lines 10 - 14.) 
38. The Court concluded that Mr. Sauer was, at the time 
of trial: (1) a married man; (2) not a citizen of the United 
States: (3) Brazilian in the United States on a work permit; (4) 
a martial arts instructor; (5) fathered a child with his wife 
while attempting to reconcile with her; (6) had been charged with 
domestic violence; (7) was charged with a possession of a firearm 
while at Lake Powell and "may have also violated his work permit 
status in the United States;" (8) participated in other 
adulterous affairs; (9) was presently going through his own 
divorce; (10) made Mrs. Sauer's United States residency status 
unknown; (11) had a dramatic affect on the breakup of the Thomas 
family; and (12) Mrs. Thomas viewed him as a very positive male 
role model. (Findings of Fact, f72 and 73.) 
39. Pedro Sauer owns and operates his own martial arts 
studio teaching Brazilian Jiu Jitsu and is an instructor for the 
United States Navy SEAL Team. (Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page 
14 
8, lines 10 — 25; page 9, lines 1-6.) 
40. Mr. Sauer entered a "plea in abeyance" as to a charge 
of possessing an unregistered gun or some similar charge. There 
was no conviction. (Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page 16, lines 9 
— 25; page 17, lines 1 — 2 5 ; page 18, lines 1 - 2 5 ; page 19, 
lines 1 - 25; and, page 20, lines 1-5.) 
41. Mr. Thomas called Martina Sauer as a witness who 
stated emphatically that Mr. Sauer has not been violent with her. 
(Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page 129, lines 2 -10.) 
42. The court found that Mr. Sauer was irresponsible, had 
impacted the Thomas family because he did not contribute 
financially to it and had a confrontation between himself and his 
spouse at the Thomas home. (Findings of Fact, 578.) 
43. Nevertheless, the court concluded, significantly: 
"Absent his [Pedro Sauer's] entry and his 
influence, it is clearly in the best 
interests of the children to be awarded to 
Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the picture, 
which he is and intends to be, it is not 
in the best interests of the children to 
be in the home and subjected to the 
negative influence and example of Pedro." 
(Emphasis added) Findings of Fact, 179. 
44. The court found that Mr. Thomas' income was $69,567 
per year which was the average income from 1988 to 1992, prior to 
separation. (Finding of Fact, fl06.) 
45. Mr. Thomas' income inexplicably, according to his own 
testimony, declined sharply since separation. (Finding of Fact, 
1104.) 
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46. Mrs. Thomas earned $25,824 per month as a school 
teacher and she was ordered to pay $334.61 per month based upon a 
sole custody worksheet (in spite of the fact that the ultimate 
custody/visitation award constitutes a joint physical custody 
relationship). (Finding of Fact, fll3.) 
47. The court found that Ann Thomas should be awarded 
$700.00 per month as alimony and properly considered all of the 
elements to arrive at that amount. (Finding of Fact, fl24 — 
127.) 
48. However, the court limited the alimony award to 
thirty-six (36) months and provided for a credit for the amounts 
paid pursuant to the temporary order. (Finding of Fact, fl27.) No 
findings were made which would indicate the basis for the thirty 
six (36) month limitation on alimony. 
49. At the time of the divorce, the parties' family home 
was worth $355,000.00. (Finding of Fact, f44.) 
50. At the time of the parties' marriage, Mr. Thomas had 
owned the building lot and had begun construction on the family 
home and it was 35% completed. (Trial Transcript, Volume III, 
page 44, lines 25; page 45, lines 1—25.) 
51. Mr. Harwood testified that the value of the home at 
the time of the marriage was $150,000.00. (Trial 
Transcript, Volume III, page 20, lines 22.) 
52 However, Mr. Harwood relied upon a "data bank" and 
comparable sales, or a "market approach" that were not reflected 
in his report and not available at the time of trial on cross 
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examination. (Trial Transcript, Volume III, page 44, lines 1 -
24; page 47, lines 4 — 7 ; and page 49, lines 11 - 14; page 51, 
lines 3 — 4 , and Exhibit 31.) 
53. The parties cohabited prior to their marriage and 
from the period of cohabitation forward Mrs. Thomas contributed 
to the construction of the home through her own manual labor, the 
acquisition of building materials, and building of retaining 
walls and generally assisting the Defendant who acted as the 
general contractor for the building of the home. The court 
characterized these efforts as "modest" on the part of Mrs. 
Thomas. (Finding of Fact, f36.) 
54. The Respondent acknowledges that Mrs. Thomas assisted 
in building the retaining walls, getting the materials for the 
home, and with the interior decoration of the home. (Trial 
Transcript, dated February 26, 1996, page 127, lines 8 - 23.) 
55. The court values Mr. Thomas' "pre—marital" interest in 
the home at $150,000.00, apparently adopting Mr. Harwood's 
opinion based upon the data base which was not available at 
trial. (Finding of Fact, f40 and 50.) 
56. Shortly after the marriage of the parties they 
borrowed $27,000.00 which has been paid during the marriage and 
had a principal balance of $17,500.00. (Trial Transcript, Volume 
IV, page 83, lines 24 - 25; page 84, lines 1-3.) The loan was 
from Mrs. Thomas' father. 
57. The title to the home was conveyed to the parties as 
joint tenants. (Finding of Fact, f34.) 
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58. Mr. Thomas owns Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. 
59. Mr. Thomas maintained a savings account in Bert 
Thomas Construction as well as an operating checking account. His 
money was required to pay company expenses or provide income for 
Mr. Thomas. Funds were transferred from the savings account to 
the checking account. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, pages 97 -
102) 
60. The average account balance for the combined savings 
and checking account prior to separation was $39,000.00 The 
average balance in the account after separation was reduced to 
$6,327.62. (See Plaintiff's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and 
Trial Transcript, Volume II, pages 99 — 104). 
61. Mr. Thomas has acknowledged utilizing the Bert Thomas 
Construction Company funds in order to pay his court ordered 
support obligation under the temporary order. (Trial Transcript, 
dated February 26, 1996, page 122, lines 8 - 19.) 
62. Mr. Thomas testified as to the value of the assets of 
Bert Thomas Construction Company. The court concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding as to the value of 
the construction company. 
63. In addition to the testimony of Derk Rasmussen, CPA, 
regarding the historical cash assets of the Construction Company, 
Mr. Thomas testified by way of his Exhibit 63 that the value of 
the company's "tools" amounted to $7,634.00. (Exhibit 63, 
amended by the Respondent at trial to include Items 113 and 114). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE THE COURT RULED THAT "IT IS CLEARLY IN THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO BE AWARDED TO ANN THOMAS" IT IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO IGNORE THAT FINDING AND AWARD THE 
CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT BASED SOLELY ON FINDINGS OR 
MORAL FITNESS AND THE CHARACTER OF A NON-COHABITING THIRD 
PARTY, 
The court correctly concluded that the children's best 
interests would be served by an award of custody to Mrs. Thomas. 
However, the court ignored that finding and awarded Mr. Thomas 
custody. The sole or controlling reasons for the award of 
custody to Mr. Thomas were: (1) Mrs. Thomas1 past moral conduct; 
and (2) the character of Pedro Sauer, a romantic acquaintance of 
the Petitioner. In so doing the court placed too much weight 
upon those factors. This is not a "close call" case. Rather, it 
is a case where the best interests of the children were otherwise 
"clear". 
The court's conclusions regarding Pedro Sauer appear to be 
based upon some other experience with Brazilian men and Brazilian 
culture. The court did not make any connection between Mrs. 
Thomas' moral conduct or Mr. Sauer's character and the 
Petitioner's parenting ability or the best interests of the 
children. In its attempt to make that connection, the court has 
simply created a transparent rationale for punishing past moral 
transgressions. 
II. ALIMONY SHOULD CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED THE 
DURATION OF THE MARRIAGE WHERE NQ FACTS APPEAR WHICH WOULD 
JUSTIFY TERMINATION AFTER THREE YEARS. INCLUDING PAYMENTS 
UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER. 
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The Petitioner does not object to the amount of alimony 
only its duration. The court limited alimony to thirty-six (36) 
months and provided the Respondent credit for payments made 
during the pendency of the case. However, there are no findings 
to indicate that circumstances will change at the end of thirty-
six months. In fact, alimony terminated prior to the entry of 
the decree. The court should extend alimony for a period of time 
not to exceed the length of the marriage. 
III. THE MARITAL HOME IS A COMMINGLED ASSET AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED TO THE PARTIES, FURTHERMORE, THERE 
IS NOT RELIABLE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT'S FINDING OF A 
PREMARITAL FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
The martial home was substantially constructed during the 
marriage. The lot was owned by the Respondent prior to the 
marriage and the home construction begun prior to that time. 
However, Mrs. Thomas has enhanced, maintained and protected the 
home. The marital home is a peculiar asset when compared with 
other, traditionally "separate" assets. It is particularly 
susceptible to "commingling" and was commingled in this case. 
This court may clarify previous decisions which may be 
contradictory or confusing regarding the commingling of 
premarital property. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED BERT THOMAS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INCLUDING THE HISTORICAL BALANCE IN 
THE LIQUID ACCOUNTS WHICH WERE DISSIPATED BY THE 
RESPONDENT. 
The court failed to make findings or to equitably 
distribute the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company. Not 
only is the company possessed of "hard" assets including 
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equipment and cash, the cash on hand was dissipated during the 
pendency of the divorce during an "inexplicable" reduction in Mr. 
Thomas1 income. The company was susceptible to valuation and is 
marital property. The use of the liquid assets by Mr. Thomas 
constitutes dissipation. 
PETAIfc OF ARCHJMEWT 
POINT I . 
WHERE THE COURT RULED THAT "IT IS CLEARLY 
IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO BE 
AWARDED TO ANN THOMAS" IT IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS TO IGNORE THAT FINDING AND AWARD 
THE CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT BASED 
SOLELY ON FINDINGS OR MORAL FITNESS AND 
THE CHARACTER OF A NON-COHABITANT THIRD 
PARTY, 
The Appellant challenges the custody ruling of the trial 
court for the following reasons: 
1. The court applied an incorrect legal standard for the 
determination of custody. The best interests of the children 
should have been given paramount and controlling consideration. 
Instead the court placed too much weight upon "past conduct and 
moral standards of the parties". 
2. The court failed to adequately articulate how Pedro 
Sauer's character deficiencies negatively affected the best 
interests of the children. The court does not attempt to show 
that Mrs. Thomas1 parenting ability is diminished because of the 
relationship with Mr. Sauer. 
3. Key factual findings regarding Mr. Sauer's past 
behavior are not supported by the evidence. 
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Trial courts have broad discretion in custody matters: 
"However, while the trial court has broad discretion, it must be 
guided at all times by the best interests of the child." Tucker 
v. Tucker, II. 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996) referring to Utah Code 
Ann. §30—3—10(1) . 
One of the factors to be considered is the moral conduct of 
the parties. However, 
"Utah courts have previously noted that a 
custodial parent's censurable extra-
marital sexual activities do not in and of 
themselves make him or her an unfit and 
improper person to have custody. Tucker v. 
Tucker I, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). See FontenQt Vt FQntenQt, 714 PI.2d 
1131, 1132-33 (Utah 1986); Shioji v. 
Shjoji, 671 P.d 135, 138 (Utah 1983); 
(Durham, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511, 514 
(Utah 1980)(Hall, C.J., dissenting); 
Kallas V, Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 
1980); Stuber v. Stuberf 121 Utah 632, 
637, 244, P.2d 650, 652 (1952). 
In order to avoid the tendency to deny custody to an 
unfaithful spouse/parent as a punitive matter, Utah courts have 
required trial judges to show: (1) that the parent's activities 
run contrary to the child's best interests; and (2) that the 
inappropriate moral conduct results in an inability to function 
adequately as the custodial parent and meet the child's needs. 
Tucker v. Tucker I, Supra, and Erwin vT Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 
(Utah App. 1989). 
It is inappropriate for the trial court to base its 
decision solely upon a party's sexual conduct. Merriam v. 
Merriamr 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1990). In that case, the 
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matter was not reversed because the court had considered other 
factors relevant to the child's best interest. In this case the 
court has considered other, relevant factors. However, in this 
case, the court determined that based upon the other factors, it 
would clearly be in the best interests of the children for Mrs. 
Thomas to be awarded their custody. The decision not to do so is 
based entirely upon either Mrs. Thomas' past moral conduct or Mr. 
Sauer's character. If the decision was based upon Mrs. Thomas' 
moral conduct, absent some connection to her parenting ability, 
the award is an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. Robertsf 835 
P.2d 193 (Cal. 1992), the concept of fault [punishment] is 
unrelated to best interests; Sanderson v. Tryonf 739 P.2d 62 3 
(Utah 1987) . The court should demonstrate how the past moral 
conduct bears upon the parties' parenting abilities or affects 
the children's best interests. 
The case before the court now is distinguishable from the 
case of Tucker v. Tuckerf supra. In that case the Supreme Court 
found that it was not a case of parental fitness. Rather, it was 
a case of basically egual parenting ability between the parents 
where the scales were tipped slightly based upon one parent's 
moral fitness. 
In this case, the court has determined that the best 
interests of the children would "clearly" be served if Ann Thomas 
were awarded custody, but for the influence of Pedro Sauer. The 
court found Pedro Sauer's influence to be "troubling" for three 
reasons: (1) because the affair broke up the Thomas family; (2) 
because Ann Thomas considered Pedro Sauer to be a positive role 
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model but was in fact "duped by his suave, debonair and romantic 
influences;" (3) that it was not in the best interests of the 
children to be in the home and subjected to his negative 
influence and example. 
In so doing, the court expressly and candidly stated that 
it would " . . . consider the best interests of the child as an 
important factor, but would also consider the past conduct and 
moral standards of the parties. . ." (Finding of Fact, f57.) 
It is apparently from the court's detailed Findings that 
this was not a "close call" case except for the question of 
infidelity and the "entry" of Pedro in the Thomas family. 
In spite of the fact that Dr. Stewart failed to detect any 
negative impact of Mr. Sauer on Mrs. Thomas' parenting ability 
for the best interests of the children, the court has based its 
custody decision on such a finding. It should be remembered that 
Dr. Jensen did not interview Pedro Sauer and could not make any 
findings about his character and affirmatively stated that Mr. 
Sauer's involvement did not play a central role in determining 
the children's best interest. 
The court, nevertheless, essentially concluded as follows: 
(1) Pedro Sauer is an unsavory character; (2) the court was 
"profoundly concerned" over Mrs. Thomas' favorable impression of 
Mr. Sauer; and (3) the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Pedro 
Sauer had a dramatic affect on the breakup of the Thomas family. 
As a result, custody should be awarded to Mr. Thomas. As a 
result the court concluded that Mr. Thomas should be awarded 
custody in spite of the fact that the other custody factors 
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clearly indicated that the children's best interests would be 
served if Mrs. Thomas was awarded custody. 
This rationale is flawed and an abuse of discretion 
because: (1) Mr. Sauer's character has not been shown to be 
relevant to the children's best interests or Mrs. Thomas' 
parenting ability; (2) some of the findings are not supported by 
the fact (those that related to domestic violence and being a 
convicted criminal); and, (3) the discussion regarding the break 
up of the Thomas family is a roundabout way of punishing Mrs. 
Thomas for marital infidelity. 
Aside from the hearsay evidence of Mr. Thomas, upon which 
Dr. Jensen relied, the only evidence regarding Pedro Sauer's 
criminal behavior is his own testimony where he testified that he 
entered a "plea in abeyance" in regards to the gun charge. 
Pedro Sauerfs wife was called to testify by Mr. Thomas. 
Her testimony was that there has been no domestic violence in the 
Sauer marriage. The only other evidence to support a finding of 
"domestic violence" would be the charge of Mrs. Sauer, previous, 
that such violence had occurred. The charge was never proven, no 
ruling was ever made upon any criminal or civil case of domestic 
or cohabitant abuse regarding Mr. Sauer. 
Beyond those findings, the trial court referred to factors 
regarding Mr. Sauer's citizenship, his own pending divorce and 
the fact that he had fathered a child with his wife while 
separated from her as a basis for denying Ann Thomas custody of 
her children (and disrupting the status quo custody order). The 
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court also found that Mr. Sauer was "suave", "debonair", and had 
"duped" Mrs, Thomas with his "romantic influence".1 
All in all the court concluded that it could not conceive 
how Pedro would be a positive role model for "little Joseph". 
Such findings about Mr. Sauerfs personality are difficult to 
quantify or define. More important, however, is the difficulty 
in relating those findings to Ann Thomas1 parenting ability or 
the best interests of the children. If this standard were 
applied to other cases, then it would be difficult for any parent 
to be awarded custody where it was shown that they were involved 
in a romantic relationship at the time of the breakdown of their 
marriage. There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Sauer was 
anything worse than a poor "role model". In fact, as the court 
found: 
"The evaluators can make no objective1 
link between the "affair1 and its impact 
on the children. The fact of the matter 
is that they are young and may not 
appreciate the consequences of a fairly 
discreet sexual affair. . ." (Findings of 
Fact, f78) 
Only when extraordinary circumstances exist should the 
court consider the impact of third parties such as step parents. 
Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the Uniform 
Custody Evaluations, sets forth the criteria that evaluators must 
consider and respond to each of the factors set forth therein. 
1
 The court demonstrated it's own personal concern 
regarding "Brazilian culture" and "machismo" in its own 
examination of Dr. Stewart. Those issues had not been raised 
anywhere else in the proceedings or at trial. (Trial Transcript, 
Volume II, page 43; lines 10 - 14.) 
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Section (3)(E)(vii) provides: "The evaluators must consider 
and respond to "kinship1, including, in extraordinary 
circumstances, step-parent status." There is nothing in this 
case to suggest that extraordinary circumstances exist in regards 
to the relationship between Mr. Sauer and the Thomas children or 
Ann Thomas for that matter. It is submitted that such 
extraordinary circumstances would include, obviously, any form of 
abuse between the third party and the subject children, or 
behavior that results in some measurable and negative way on the 
best interests of the children. The court has acknowledged in 
paragraph 78 of its Findings that no such circumstances exist. 
Dr. Stewart specifically found that there was an absence of 
any negative impact on the 
Thomas children by virtue of the relationship between Mrs. Thomas 
and Mr. Sauer. in fact, Mr. Sauer's presence was "soothing" for 
the Thomas children. 
The initial inquiry should be as to the relevance of the 
findings regarding Mr. Sauer's citizenship, occupation, criminal 
record (if one exists) or other character attributes. Mr. Sauer 
is not even a cohabitant in this controversy. Nobody who 
interviewed the children, including the Judge, was able to 
identify any negative impact of Mr. Sauer on the children. 
The court has attempted to justify the custody award by 
finding that Mr. Sauer has not contributed financially to the 
Thomas family, that there was a confrontation at the Thomas house 
(albeit brief), which was "not positive for the children", that 
Mr. Sauer is a convicted criminal and there has been a spouse 
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abuse charge, and that Mr. Sauer had a dramatic affect on the 
breakup of the Thomas family. None of these findings has anything 
to do, except in the most collateral and vague sense, with the 
best interests of the children or Mrs. Thomas' parenting ability. 
Taken together they do not form the basis of overcoming what the 
court also found to be "clearly in the best interests 
of the children" which would be an award of custody to Ann 
Thomas. 
Whether Pedro Sauer is a "suave, debonair", convicted 
criminal and spouse abuser, and whether Mrs. Thomas does not 
believe any of that, does not form a sufficient factual basis for 
the court's custody award. Those allegations, even if taken at 
face value, do not overcome the court's ultimate conclusion that 
Mrs. Thomas should be awarded custody but for Mr. Sauer's entry 
and influence in the equation. 
POINT II. 
ALIMONY SHOULD CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD NOT 
TO EXCEED THE DURATION OF THE MARRIAGE 
WHERE NO FACTS APPEAR WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY 
TERMINATION AFTER THREE YEARS, INCLUDING 
PAYMENTS UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER. 
The court addressed the issue of alimony in its findings 
no. 115 through 127. In so doing the court properly considered 
the needs of Mrs. Thomas, her ability to meet her own needs and 
the ability of Mr. Thomas to assist her. However, the court 
inexplicably limited the duration of alimony to three years. 
Moreover, the court awarded the Defendant "credit" for amounts 
paid pursuant to the temporary order of the court. (Finding of 
Fact fl27.) The temporary order of the court was entered on the 
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11 day of January, 1992. Therefore, alimony terminated before the 
Decree was even entered. 
Utah courts have found that in the absence of articulated 
findings showing some anticipated change in circumstances, or 
grounds for "rehabilitative" alimony, the limitation of alimony 
to an arbitrary period of time is an abuse of discretion. 
Thronscpn Vt ThronSQn, 810 P. 2d 428 (Utah App. 1991) (an otherwise 
appropriate award of $800.00 per month alimony, but limited to 
one year was made permanent where there were no supporting 
findings or rationale for the limitation on duration.) In this 
case there is nothing to suggest that circumstances will change 
in any financial sense. There were certainly no findings to 
explain why the court limited alimony to three years or why the 
court granted "credit" for the alimony paid during the pendency 
of the case. Normally, decisions regarding the divorce are made 
at the time of the decree or trial. The exception to that 
general rule should be based upon clearly stated grounds such as 
the obstructive activity of a party, the hiding of assets, or the 
dissipation of assets. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah 
App. 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); and 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 (Utah 1980). 
POINT III. 
THE MARITAL HOME IS A COMMINGLEP ASSET ANP 
SHOVLP HAVE PEEN EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTEP TO 
THE PARTIES, FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NOT 
RELIABLE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT'S 
FINPING OF A PREMARITAL FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
The Appellant does not contest the court's findings 
regarding the fair market value of the home at the time of the 
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divorce. Mrs. Thomas1 objections are two fold: (1) the failure 
of the court to consider the home as a marital asset and 
"commingle" any premarital portion of the Respondent; and (2) the 
lack of evidence to support the court's finding of a premarital 
value in the home of $150,000.00. 
Mr. Thomas owned the building lot upon which the family 
home was constructed for several years prior to the marriage. 
During this period of time the parties1 cohabited. Likewise, the 
parties worked together on the construction of the home, before 
and after marriage. At the time of the marriage the home was 
approximately 35% constructed. 
Obviously, 65% of the home was constructed after the 
marriage. In fact, the testimony of Mr. Thomas was that the home 
was essentially a work in progress and was still being modified 
and constructed at the time of the trial. 
The home was pledged for a loan which was paid during the 
marriage and had a balance due at the time of the trial. The 
home had been transferred from Mr. Thomas1 name into the joint 
names of the parties. Mrs. Thomas had separate assets at the 
time of the divorce. Her separate assets consisted of stock 
which had been gifted to her (with similar gifts going to her 
siblings) of stock from her father and grandfather. These funds 
had been maintained entirely separately, in Mrs. Thomas1 name 
throughout the marriage. 
The rule regarding separate property, and "commingled" 
property is set forth in Mortensen v. Mortensenf 760 P.2d 304 
(Utah 1988) . The rule is simple: Separate property acquired by a 
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spouse prior to the marriage, by gift or inheritance during the 
marriage, should be awarded to that party, unless: 
"(1) the other spouse has by his or her 
effort or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of 
that property thereby acquiring any 
equitably interest in it, or (2) the 
property has been consumed or its identify 
lost through the commingling or exchanges 
or where the acquiring spouse has made a 
gift of an interest there and to the other 
spouse. MQrtensen, gupr?t, at 306 
(citations omitted). 
Cases dealing with separate property which follow Mortensen 
had obscured that rule. See, Utah Bar Journal, Volume XI, No. 3, 
The Conundrum of Gifted, Inherited and Premarital Property in 
Divorce, April, 1998, pages 16-24, David S. Dolowitz, attached 
as Exhibit G in the Addendum. 
Some properties are more likely to be commingled due to 
"enhancement, maintenance and protection" than others. Other 
factors would indicate that otherwise separate property has been 
transformed to marital property such as: the length of time that 
the property exists during the marriage, the nature of the 
property, real estate occupied by the parties, separate bank 
accounts, separate securities, whether the asset requires the 
ongoing use of marital funds to pay property taxes, mortgage 
expenses, maintenance, remodeling, repairs or the like: 
"The longer gifted, inherited or premarital 
property is maintained during a marriage 
the more difficult it is to show it is a 
separate property. . . As discussed above, 
the payment of property taxes, 
refinancing, maintenance, remodeling, 
repair of a home or a rental property 
presents the probability of commingling." 
The Conundrum . . . " Suprar at page 23. 
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The rationale of the court in awarding Mr. Thomas 
$150,000.00 as premarital separate property is as follows: (1) 
the property was not commingled; and (2) even if it were because 
it is clear that Mrs. Thomas should get her separate property it 
is only fair for Mr. Thomas to be awarded his. 
If Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra, is to have any meaning, 
then a case such as this should result in a conclusion that the 
family home is a marital asset. It was primarily constructed 
during the marriage. In addition to the payment of a mortgage, 
taxes, remodeling, repair and maintenance, Mrs. Thomas worked 
side by side with Mr. Thomas constructing the structure. To 
compare this asset with Mrs. Thomas1 separate assets is a case of 
"apples and oranges". In addition, the basis upon which the 
court relied in forming its opinion as to the value of the home 
at marriage is flawed. The court relied upon the evaluation of 
Jud Harvard. That appraisal is called a "complete appraisal -
restricted appraisal". It purports to state the value of the 
property in 1982 and at the time of trial. The appraisal as to 
the 1982 value states that Mr. Harvard relied upon "appraisal 
files on other properties that I appraised in the early and mid-
1980s. . ." And that Mr. Harvard " . . . researched the market 
and comparable sales that were transacted in the Sundance area 
during the early and mid-1980s." Exhibit 3, appraisal of Jud 
Harvard at pages 5 and 6. However, none of the underlying data 
regarding the 1982 valuation is set forth in the appraisal, nor 
was the data bank or other information relied upon by Mr. Harvard 
available at trial. 
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Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence require that: "The 
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying 
facts or data on cross examination." Mr. Harvard was unable to 
do this. The Petitioner's appraisal did not opine regarding the 
1982 value because of the unreliability of any such opinion. 
POINT IVf 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE VALUED AND 
DISTRIBUTED PERT THQNAS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY INCLUDING TflE HISTORICAL BALANCE 
IN THE LIQUID ACCOUNTS WHICH WERE 
DISSIPATED BY THE RESPONDENT. 
The court refused to: (1) place a value on Bert Thomas 
Construction Company; and (2) find that the use of the savings 
account during the pendency of the action by Mr. Thomas 
constituted dissipation. The court did find that the reduction 
in Mr. Thomas1 income was "inexplicable". The court found that 
Mr. Thomas "has been a reasonably successful contractor earning, 
typically during the years, just prior to separation, 
approximately $70,000.00.) Furthermore, 
"Inexplicably and contrary to the 
Defendant's own testimony, the actual Bert 
Thomas Construction Company revenue has 
declined sharply since separation 
regardless of the trend of residential 
construction in Utah County and the 
previous Bert Thomas construction trend." 
See Exhibit 13 (Findings of Fact, fl04). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Thomas relied upon the cash on 
hand in Bert Thomas Construction Company accounts (savings and 
checking) during the pendency of the case. Furthermore, these 
funds were depleted, substantially, because of the "inexplicable" 
reduction in Mr. Thomas1 income. Derk Rasmussen, CPA, testified 
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on behalf of the Petition that the Bert Thomas Construction 
Account balances reduced from a combined average balance of 
approximately $37,000.00 for the four years prior to separation, 
to $7,470.00 at the time of the trial. (Exhibit 9, 10 and 11.) 
Mr. Thomas introduced his own testimony regarding any tools 
on hand for his construction company with a total combined value 
at the time of trial of $7,634.00, see Exhibit 63. 
The Petitioner did not seek to attribute any good will to 
the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company (or the related 
leasing company). The Petitioner only sought a value for the 
"hard assets" which would consist of tools, inventory and cash on 
hand. Evidence was before the court on each of these iteMrs. It 
simply called for adding the amounts together. 
The only difficult issue is whether or not Mr. Thomas 
dissipated this marital asset. In that sense it does not matter 
whether the parties used Bert Thomas Construction Company money 
as a de facto family savings account. Even if they did not, it 
was part of the marital asset. 
Utah courts have adopted the doctrine of dissipation of 
marital assets. Where marital assets are used without the 
approval or knowledge of the other spouse, in an effort to hide 
those assets, or in such a manner as to benefit only one party, 
the court may find the dissipation of assets. Jeffries v. 
Jeffries, 895 P.2d 835 at 838 (Utah App. 1995). See, also, 
Shepherd v. Shepherd. 816 P.2d 249 (Utah App. 1994). 
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have held that the use of 
marital assets for payment of temporary support obligations 
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constitutes dissipation. Lynn v. Lynnr 165 N.J. Super. 328 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1979), and Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. (N.J. App. 
Div. 1988) . 
Mr. Thomas should be required to account for the legitimate 
and business use of those funds. This is especially so in light 
of the inexplicable reduction in his income during the pendency 
of the case. If, as the Petitioner alleges, Mr. Thomas 
voluntarily reduced his self employment income and relied upon 
substantial account balances for his support, as well as the 
payment of temporary support obligations, that behavior should 
constitute dissipation. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's custody decision was clearly erroneous where it 
ignored its own finding regarding the best interests of the 
children. Similarly, the best interest of the children is a 
controlling conclusion not an "important" finding. Where the 
best interest of the children would clearly be served by the 
Petitioner being awarded custody, it is clearly erroneous for the 
court to conclude contrary to that where the past moral conduct 
of the custodial parent does not interfere with her parenting 
ability or the best interests of the children. Likewise, the 
character of a non-cohabitant third party was given too much 
weight by the trial court and does not bear upon Mrs. Thomas1 
parenting ability or the best interests of the children. 
The alimony amount is not contested by the Petitioner. 
However, the duration of alimony was limited to thirty-six (36) 
months without any explanation or finding to support that ruling. 
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By providing the Respondent "credit" for payments under the 
temporary order, alimony actually terminated before the entry of 
the decree. This conclusion is not supported by the findings and 
is clearly erroneous. The court refused to make a finding 
regarding the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company, a 
marital asset. Sufficient facts were introduced to do so, 
including evidence regarding the historical balances in liquid 
accounts maintained by the company. These accounts were drawn 
down and dissipated by the Respondent during the pendency of the 
action. The value of the company, prior to dissipation, should 
have been equitably divided. 
The home of the parties was substantially constructed 
during the marriage. It was clearly augmented, maintained and 
protected by Mrs. Thomas and should have been included in its 
entirety in the marital estate. If not, the court erred in 
concluding that there was a "premarital" separate portion of the 
fair market value of $150,000. This finding is not based upon 
reliable and credible evidence. 
The court's conclusions regarding custody should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for appropriate findings and 
decision regarding the Respondent's visitation and parental 
rights. Additionally, on remand the court should equitably 
distribute the value of the family home and Bert Thomas 
Construction Company. Lastly, this court should extend the 
duration of alimony to a term not to exceed the length of the 
marriage. 
36 
day of July, 1998. 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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